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11 Introduction
In long-term principal–agent relationships with complete contracts, the principal
prepares payment schedules in advance and these schedules potentially depend on
the agent’s period-wise performance (i.e., performance related to the level of ef-
fort), in order to provide proper incentives. In the light of the celebrated sufﬁcient
statistic theorem (Holmstr¨ om (1979)), one may expect that using a very detailed
history of past performances, each of which are informative of the agent’s efforts,
is optimal for the principal in preparing payment schedules. In reality, however,
we often observe various incentive schemes that are not necessarily dependent on
the entire detailed record of performances but only on a subset of them, where
such subsets are sometimes much smaller than the entire set of performances.
From the viewpoint of economic studies, such simple contracts are interpreted
in several ways. One argument is that the principal incurs costs in preparing or
enforcing complex contracts, after taking such costs into consideration, some sort
of simple contract is concluded as a suboptimal solution. Another possibility,
following Holmstr¨ om and Milgrom (1987), is that simple payment schedules are
justiﬁed by their robustness to the change of model parameters. Understanding
that such interpretations provide insights that enable us to grasp important aspects
of contracts in reality, the present paper aims to study a third way of explaining
simple contracts.1
Consider an environment where the agent’s current efforts have persistent ef-
fects over the future performances. In such environments, a contract that provides
strong incentives in the future induces the agent to work hard in the present, and
the role of such future incentives appears to be more important in such situations
than in those where the agent’s efforts have no persistent effects. However, this
is not to say that providing incentives only in the future is sufﬁcient: the agent’s
1It should be noted that the current paper does not aim to provide a universal explanation for
simple contracts (as in Holmstr¨ om and Milgrom (1987)), but looks for an explanation that works
in a particular class of environments.
2current performance is still informative about present efforts,2 and we may expect
that every informative performance should be included in the optimal contract, no
matter how low their informativeness may be. The present paper shows that this
is not always the case; that is, we show that an incentive scheme that depends only
on the ﬁnal performance is optimal if the agent’s effort in each period has strong
persistent effects.
We provide sufﬁcient conditions for such simple contracts to be optimal in
dynamic moral hazard models, in which the cost of efforts is the same in all peri-
ods. The common feature of our sufﬁcient conditions is summarized as follows:
the probability distribution of the ﬁnal outcome when the agent shirks only in the
ﬁnal period ﬁrst-order stochastically dominates (FOS-dominates hereafter) the
distribution when the agent shirks in any other period in such a way that the ex-
pected number of shirking events is one. To grasp the idea behind this condition
intuitively, consider a two-period model in which the agent’s ﬁrst-period action
also affects the probability distribution of the second-period outcome. Let (a;a′)
denote the action proﬁle in which the ﬁrst element (second element) indicates the
agent’s ﬁrst-period action (second-period action, respectively), and let ¯ a (a) de-
note a strong effort (a shirk, respectively). Then, the sufﬁcient condition has the
following two requirements (Assumption 1).
(i) The probability distribution of the second-period outcome when the agent
shirks only in the second period (¯ a;a) FOS-dominates the distribution when
the agent shirks only in the ﬁrst period (a; ¯ a).
(ii) The probability distribution of the second-period outcome when the agent
shirks only in the second period (¯ a;a) FOS-dominates the half-and-half
mixture of (a) the distribution when the agent shirks in both periods (a;a)
and (b) the distribution when the agent never shirks in any period (¯ a; ¯ a).
We can understand this sufﬁcient condition in the following way. Suppose that
2In the paper, we assume that performances are statistically independent between one period
and the next. See Section 2 for the formal model.
3the principal can (somehow) force the agent to work hard in the ﬁrst period. Then
the principal’s problem is to design the contract so that the agent ﬁnds it optimal
to work hard in the second period (given that the agent is forced to worked hard in
the ﬁrst period). Such an optimal contract provides the agent with higher expected
payoff (the sum of wages and effort costs) by taking (¯ a; ¯ a) than by taking (¯ a;a).
Note that this optimal contract depends only on the second-period outcome so that
it is a contract in which “only the ﬁnal outcome matters.”
Additionally suppose that this “optimal” contract is an increasing function of
second-period outcomes.3 Then requirement (i) ensures that shirking in the ﬁrst
period (a; ¯ a) always makes the agent worse off than shirking in the second period
(¯ a;a) does, since the cost of efforts is the same between the two action proﬁles
(i.e., one effort) and FOSD ensures that the agent’s expected wage by taking (¯ a;a)
is larger than by taking (a; ¯ a).4 So given this contract, the agent never ﬁnds it
optimal to undertake (a; ¯ a), even if there is no “forced labor” in the ﬁrst period.
Requirement (ii), on the other hand, ensures that shirking in both periods (a;a)
makes the agent worse off compared with shirking in the second period (¯ a;a).
The argument behind this requirement is bit more complicated since the effort
costs are different between the two action proﬁles, (¯ a;a) and (a;a). As we will
see later, such a comparison is made by a FOSD between well-designed mixtures
of action proﬁles with the same expected number of efforts. In requirement (ii),
this is achieved by setting the expected number of efforts to be one on both sides
(1=0:5×2+0:5×0). Thus, under requirements (i) and (ii), the agent never ﬁnds
it optimal to undertake either (a; ¯ a) or (a;a) even if there is no forced labor in the
ﬁrst period, as long as the contract induces the agent to take (¯ a; ¯ a) rather than
(¯ a;a). This is how the contract in which only the ﬁnal outcome matters provides
a sufﬁcient incentive to work hard in both periods.
3As is known in the literature, the monotone likelihood ratio property (MLRP) is required for
the optimal contract to be an increasing function. Subsection 2.1 discusses the case of MLRP.
In Subsection 2.2, we argue how the sufﬁcient condition, (i) and (ii), is rewritten if MLRP is not
satisﬁed.
4FOSD provides a sufﬁcient condition for a comparison between expectations of increasing
functions.
4Strong persistent effects of efforts as characterized by the FOSD are the main
sources of our result. Historical dependence of this sort is often seen in real eco-
nomic environments. For example, if an effort has a time-lag effect into the next
period, as well as the direct effect in the current period, then the probability of
success in period 2 is inﬂuenced by the effort level in period 1. If the production
technology involves irreversibility, then the model becomes history dependent in
a similar manner. We discuss these examples brieﬂy in Section 2.
In Section 3, we show how the result in Section 2 is extended to a general
T-period setting. The extension is modestly straightforward and again the point
is the FOSD between mixtures of action proﬁles with the same expected number
of efforts. Human capital investment is discussed as an example of the sufﬁcient
condition.
1.1 Related Literature
Much simpler models than the one in the present paper have been studied in inde-
pendentworksbyKwon(2006), MukoyamaandS ¸ahin(2005), andOgawa(2003).
In their studies, outcomes take only two values, “success” and “failure”, and sim-
pliﬁed versions of our requirements (i) and (ii) are presented as the sufﬁcient con-
dition for the simple contract.5 The present paper studies a model with N possible
outcomes and the proof is given in an organized manner using the property of
FOSD, which provides clear and rigorous interpretations of the earlier works.6
Studies on the dynamic models of the moral hazard problem date back to Lam-
5Although the distinction between MLRP and FOSD is important in the incentive theories with
hidden actions (Mas-Colell, Whinston, and Green (1995, Section 14.B)), the two conditions are
given by the same inequality
Pr[“success” | ¯ a] > Pr[“success” | ¯ a]
in the 2-outcome models.
6The earlier works have another contributions. Mukoyama and S ¸ahin (2005) provided some
numerical analyses when the theoretical approach is difﬁcult. The highlight of Kwon (2006) is the
empirical analysis using health insurance data. The “nonincreasing marginal returns” condition by
Kwon (2006) is a special case of our sufﬁcient condition (see Section 3).
5bert (1983) and Rogerson (1985). Their studies are on the repeated model in the
sense that there is no persistent effects as studied in the present paper. In repeated
moral hazard, it is shown that the optimal contract depends on the entire history of
outcomes (memory effect in Rogerson (1985)). Our paper, in contrast, shows that
the optimal contract depends only on the ﬁnal outcome under certain sufﬁcient
conditions.
Dynamic moral hazard problems then have been studied in various exten-
sions. Problems in which the agent can access a bank are analyzed by Fudenberg,
Holmstrom, and Milgrom (1990) and Chiappori, Macho, Rey, and Salani´ e (1994)
among others. Renegotiation problems in dynamic moral hazard are studied by
FudenbergandTirole(1990), Ma(1991), Ma(1994), andMatthews(1995)among
others. In the present paper, we assume that there is no access to banks and no
renegotiation.
The relationship between sufﬁcient statistic theorem (Holmstr¨ om (1979)) and
our result casts an interesting light on the interpretation of “informativeness” in
economic studies. In the view of the sufﬁcient statistic theorem, every statisti-
cally informative signal is useful (and should be used) in the optimal contract,
whereas in our model, the principal sometimes ﬁnds it optimal to “ignore” some
statistically informative signals.
Recent theoretical studies on repeated moral hazard problems include Jarque
(2010), who considers a similar problem with inﬁnite horizon, continuum effort.
The current paper studies the model with two effort levels and we do not need to
replace incentive constraints with ﬁrst-order conditions.
2 The Basic Model
We study a simple dynamic moral hazard model with “history dependence.” The
relationship between a principal (she) and an agent (he) lasts for two periods (t =
1;2).
In each period, the agent chooses his action at from the action space A =
6{a; ¯ a}. These actions are unobservable to the principal. We may ﬁnd it convenient
to interpret these actions as effort levels and say that the agent works hard (shirks)
when he chooses ¯ a (a).
In period t, after the agent has chosen his action at, the outcome xt ∈
{x1;··· ;xN} ≡ X is realized according to probabilities that depend on the history
of the agent’s actions; that is, the distribution of x1 depends on a1, whereas that
of x2 depends on the pair (a1;a2). These outcomes are immediately observed
by both parties (and assumed to be veriﬁable to third parties, such as a court).
We may regard these outcomes as performances and identify each of them with a
corresponding revenue received by the principal.
We assume that x1 and x2 are independently distributed;7 hereafter, we write
the distributions as given below:
p1
i (a1) = Pr
[
x1 = xi | a1]
(i = 1;··· ;N);
p2
i (a1;a2) = Pr
[
x2 = xi | (a1;a2)
]
(i = 1;··· ;N):
Throughout the paper, we assume that the distributions have full support:
p1
i (a1) > 0 for all (i;a1) ∈ {1;··· ;N}×A;
p2
i (a1;a2) > 0 for all (i;a1;a2) ∈ {1;··· ;N}×A2:
At the beginning of the game (i.e., before t = 1), the principal and the agent
sign a contract in the manner detailed below.
First, the principal offers a long-term contract w = (w1;w2), where w1 =
(w1(x1))x1∈X and w2 = (w2(x1;x2))(x1;x2)∈X2 are payment schedules for periods
1 and 2, respectively, under outcome realizations (x1;x2). Such a contract stipu-
lates N+N2 possible payments, depending on the realizations of outcomes. Next,
the agent decides whether to accept or reject the contract offered by the principal.
7Under this assumption, the realized value of x1 does not inﬂuence the distribution of x2, so
the former yields no information on the current likelihood of any particular production levels in
period 2. The “history dependence” discussed in this paper deals with the case where x2 is affected
by a1, but not by the realization of x1.
7If the agent refuses the offered contract, both parties receive their reservation util-
ities and the game comes to an end. If the agent accepts the contract, the game
enters into the two-time moral hazard repetition discussed above.
We assume that the principal can commit to the long-term contract that she
has offered before t = 1, therefore, once the contract is accepted by the agent,
the principal cannot change the payment schedule w and must make the payment
in each period according to the history of outcome realizations up to the date of
payment. In addition, we assume that the agent must commit to his participation
in the game, therefore, once he accepts the contract, he cannot exit in the midst of
the game and must participate in it until the end of period 2.
In each period, the agent attains a payoff of u(w)−c(a), where u is strictly
increasing and strictly concave (the agent is risk averse) and c(a) < c(¯ a) (harder
work involves a greater cost). We normalize this as c(a) = 0 and c(¯ a) =C.
Given a long-term contract w, the agent’s strategy consists of two parts: one
is the action he takes in the ﬁrst period, a1, and the other is the action schedule
for the second period a2 = (a2
i )N
i=1, each of which speciﬁes the action he takes
in period 2 under the outcome realization of x1 in period 1.8 Let Ui(a1;a2
i ;w2)
denote the expected utility in period 2 for the agent when he chose a1 and the

























8Accordingly, we allow the agent to change his action in period 2 after he observes the outcome
realization in period 1, which is one of the standard assumptions in this literature. Once we stop
making this assumption and assume that the agent has to commit to a pair of actions (a1;a2)
ex ante, then the model reduces to a one-shot multitask incentive problem. We will make the
sequentiality assumption to focus on the dynamics of the model, but note that the main result of
the paper also applies to the one-shot multitask model.
9We assume that both the principal and the agent have a common discount factor of one. If
8The optimization problem for the principal when she wishes to implement an



















U(a1;a2;w) ≥U(a′;a′′;w); a′ ̸= a1; ∀a′′ ∈ AN; (IC1)
Ui(a1;a2
i ;w2) ≥Ui(a1;a′;w2); a′ ̸= a2
i ; i = 1;··· ;N; (IC2)
U(a1;a2;w) ≥ 2¯ u; (PC)
where ¯ u denotes the reservation utility for the agent.10
2.1 Simple Contract
In this subsection, we show that the optimal long-term contract is dependent only
on the second-period outcome if the probability distribution of the second-period
outcome satisﬁes certain conditions, as brieﬂy discussed in the Introduction. The
result (Theorem 1) contrasts with that of the repeated moral hazard literature,
where the optimal long-term contract is always dependent on the complete history
of past outcomes.
Throughout this subsection, we assume that
p2









the common discount factor was less than one (but positive) and the outcome space consisted of
three elements or more, we could not attain the plausible sufﬁcient conditions as in Assumption 1,
which relies on the nature of (p1
i (·)) and (p2
i (·;·)). Mukoyama and S ¸ahin (2005) showed that
when N = 2, an extension of Assumption 1 is a sufﬁcient condition for w1(x1) to be constant, in a
similar model in which both players have a common discount factor of less than one.
10When the model is just a repetition of two moral hazard stages (as in Lambert (1983) and
Rogerson (1985)), the action taken in period 1, a1, does not affect the probability distribution of
outcomes in period 2, such that Ui(a′;a2
i ;w2) = Ui(a′′;a2
i ;w2) for any a′ ̸= a′′. This reduces the
incentive constraints for the ﬁrst period (IC1) to
U(a1;a2;w) ≥U(a′;a2;w); (a′ ̸= a1); (1)
under which we must only take into account the deviation strategies from a1 to the other a′, with
a2 being ﬁxed.
9for the sake of a simple exposition. (2) is referred to as the monotone likelihood
ratioproperty(MLRP),andplaysanimportantroleinthemonotonicityofoptimal
contracts in the basic moral hazard model.11 In Subsection 2.2, we discuss how
thesufﬁcientcondition(Assumption1below)isdescribedif(2)isnotsatisﬁed. At
this point we should note that the discussion in Subsection 2.2 is not restrictive,
and there we can describe an analogue of Assumption 1 for any given pairs of
p2
j(¯ a; ¯ a) and p2
j(¯ a;a) which do not satisfy MLRP.
The following assumption provides a sufﬁcient condition for such simple con-
tracts. We may regard this assumption as relating to “strong persistent effects”
in the sense that the action chosen in period 1 has a stronger inﬂuence on the
outcome in period 2 than does the action chosen in period 2.
Assumption 1. p2




k(a; ¯ a) ≥ å
j
k=1 p2













k(¯ a;a) for all j = 1;:::;N.
Condition (i) states that (¯ a;a) (ﬁrst-order) stochastically dominates (a; ¯ a), so











Condition (ii) is the stochastic dominance between (¯ a;a) and 1


















for any increasing function g.12 Given a pair of p2
j(¯ a; ¯ a) and p2
j(¯ a;a), conditions
(i) and (ii) are mutually independent.
11MLRP’s implications in the principal-agent problem are discussed in Milgrom (1981).
12For comprehensive discussions of stochastic orders, see Mas-Colell et al. (1995, Section 6.D),
Shaked and Shanthikumar (2007) for instance.
10Adifferentinterpretationofcondition(ii)canbedoneinthefollowingmanner.






k(¯ a; ¯ a)
















k(¯ a; ¯ a)
)
≥ 0:
Therefore, condition (ii) implies that (¯ a;a) has to be “closer” to (¯ a; ¯ a), compared
with (a;a).
Here, we provide two examples of probability distributions that satisfy As-
sumption 1. In both examples, it is assumed that the outcome is either “success”
or “failure” (N = 2).
Example 1 (Time lag). There is a time lag between the effort and its effect.
If the agent works hard in period t, it increases the probability of success not
only in the same period by a but also in the following period by b. We assume
that 0 < a < b, and regard b as a “full effect” of the effort and a as a “partial
effect” of the effort. Let p denote the probability of success when the agent has
never taken any positive efforts. Then, we have
p1
success(a) = p; p1
success(¯ a) = p +a;
p2
success(a;a) = p; p2
success(a; ¯ a) = p +a;
p2
success(¯ a;a) = p +b; p2
success(¯ a; ¯ a) = p +a +b:
Example 2 (Irreversibility). The agent has to make a positive effort in every pe-
riod to maintain the highest probability of success ¯ p. If he shirks, the probability
of success declines by g and this degree of success is not recovered even if the
agent makes a positive effort in the following period:
p1
success(a) = ¯ p −g; p1
success(¯ a) = ¯ p;
p2
success(a;a) = ¯ p −2g; p2
success(a; ¯ a) = ¯ p −g
p2
success(¯ a;a) = ¯ p −g; p2
success(¯ a; ¯ a) = ¯ p:
The main result is as follows.
11Theorem 1. Suppose that the probability distribution of the second-period out-
come satisﬁes Assumption 1. Then, the optimal long-term contract w that imple-
ments a1 = ¯ a and a2 = (¯ a;:::; ¯ a) is such that
(a) w1(x1) is a constant for all x1 and
(b) w2(x1;x2) is independent of x1 and depends only on x2.
Proof. The proof proceeds in two steps. In the ﬁrst step, we solve a “relaxed”




















i ;w2) ≥Ui(a1;a′;w2); a′ ̸= a2
i ; i = 1;··· ;N; (IC2)
U(a1;a2;w) ≥ 2¯ u; (PC)
and show that the solution satisﬁes the properties (a) and (b). In the second step,
we verify that (any of the) contract satisfying properties (a) and (b) are always
compatible with the constraint (IC1). By these two steps, we conclude that the
solution to the “original” optimization problem (P) satisﬁes properties (a) and (b).
1. The ﬁrst-order condition for w1(xi) in the “relaxed” problem (P′) is
1
u′(w1(xi))
= n for all xi;
where n is the Lagrange multiplier with respect to (PC). Thus, w1(xi) is a constant
for all xi.











j(¯ a; ¯ a)
]
+n; (3)
where mi is the Lagrange multiplier with respect to (IC2) for the correspond-
ing i. Here, w2(xi;xj) is independent of i (otherwise, the principal could be
12strictly better off by offering the certainty equivalence ˜ w′
j, such that u( ˜ w′
j) =
åi p1
i (¯ a)u(w2(xi;xj)), withoutaffectingtheremainingconstraints(IC2)and(PC)).
Hence, the ratio mi=pi(¯ a) is a constant for all i.
If mi = 0, then w2(xi;xj) is a constant for all j, which violates (IC2) for i.
Hence, mi > 0 should be satisﬁed for all i, which means that (IC2) is binding for
all i in the optimum. Therefore, w2(xi;xj) depends only on j. In particular, from
the concavity of the utility function and the deﬁnition of j, w2(xi;xj) is increasing
in j .
2. First, we check that (IC1) is satisﬁed for two deviation strategies, (a1;a2)=
(a; ¯ a;··· ; ¯ a) and (a1;a2) = (a;a;··· ;a), under the optimal contract derived in step
1. Here, we write w1(xi)=w1 and w2(xi;xj)=w2
j, as the contract is not dependent
on xi.



























since u(wj) is an increasing function of j. (5) together with (4) implies (IC1) with




















which implies (IC1) with a′ = a′′ = a.
Finally, we check that (IC1) is satisﬁed for any deviation strategies, (a1;a2) =
(a;a2
1;··· ;a2
N). Suppose the agent undertakes a2
i = ¯ a if i ∈ ¯ I ⊂ {1;··· ;N} and
a2
i = a if i ∈ I = {1;··· ;N}\ ¯ I. The intertemporal payoff to the agent following








































= max{U(a; ¯ a;··· ; ¯ a;w); U(a;a;··· ;a;w)}
≤U(¯ a; ¯ a;··· ; ¯ a;w);
where the last inequality is derived from the previous result that (IC1) is satisﬁed
both for (a1;a2) = (a; ¯ a;··· ; ¯ a) and for (a1;a2) = (a;a;··· ;a). Hence, (IC1) is
satisﬁed for any deviation strategy (a1;a2) = (a;a2
1;··· ;a2
N).
The intuition behind the proof is as follows. For the principal who intends to
induce the agent to exert the positive effort ¯ a in period 2, it is necessary to make
the second-period payment w2(xi;xj) dependent on the second-period outcome xj,
as this is the only source of incentive power available. However, such a payment
schedule induces the agent to work hard in period 1 because the distribution of
second-period outcomes is affected not only by a2 but also by a1. Assumption 1
(i) ensures that the agent always obtains a larger gross expected payoff in terms
of wages by undertaking action proﬁle (¯ a;a) than by undertaking (a; ¯ a) as a result
of the FOSD. In addition, as the cost of effort, C, is the same in both periods,
the agent obtains a larger net expected payoff as well. Thus, if the contract is to
induce hard work by the agent in the second period, it automatically provides the
agent with the incentive to work hard in the ﬁrst period. Assumption 1 (ii), on
the other hand, ensures that the agent does not deviate to a strategy of shirking
in both periods (i.e., to (a;a)). Half-and-half mixture of the two probability dis-
tributions, (¯ a; ¯ a) and (a;a), gives the agent’s gross expected payoff from taking
(a;a) in accordance with the beneﬁt of effort cost reduction normalized to C (a
one-time shirk). Thus, if the contract is to induce hard work in the second period,
it automatically makes the agent worse off if he shirks in both periods, (a;a).
To summarize, if the probability distribution of the second-period outcome
when the agent shirks only in the second period (¯ a;a) FOS-dominates the distri-
bution when the agent shirks in any other periods in such a way that the expected
number of shirkings is one, providing incentives to work hard in the second pe-
14riod becomes sufﬁcient to induce the agent to make strong efforts in both periods.
As we will see in Section 3, such arguments regarding FOSD and one-time shirk-
ing play central roles in T-period models as well. We also discuss the sufﬁcient
conditions for simple contracts for T-period models in a similar manner.
2.2 Non-MLRP Case
In this subsection, we discuss how an analogue of Assumption 1 is described if
p2
j(¯ a;a) and p2
j(¯ a;a) do not satisfy MLRP.
For making the problem non-trivial, we suppose that
p2





k(¯ a; ¯ a)
p2
k(¯ a;a)
for all j ̸= k
is satisﬁed.13 Then we have a unique rearrangement (permutation) k(1);:::;k(N)
of 1;:::;N so that
p2









MLRP in the previous subsection is equivalent to (k(1);:::;k(N)) = (1;:::;N).










k(k)(¯ a;a) for all j = 1;:::;N;











The difference from the normal stochastic dominance cases is that the function g
should be increasing in terms of the permutated numbers k(1);:::;k(N).











k(j)(¯ a; ¯ a)
]
+n;
13Equalities can be allowed for a subset of {1;:::;N}, but we avoid such cases for the sake of a
brief exposition.
15and, following the similar argument as in the proof, w2(xi;xk(j)) is increasing in j













which is satisﬁed since u(w2
k(j)) is increasing in j and (¯ a;a) FOS-dominates (a; ¯ a)
intermsofk(j). SimilarargumentholdsforAssumption1(ii)anditsimplications
in the proof.
The following example depicts the role of k(j) in the case where MLRP is not
satisﬁed. Suppose N = 3 (e.g., a performance is either low, middle, or high), and
the distributions are given as in the table.
j 1 2 3 k(1) = 2 k(2) = 1 k(3) = 3
(¯ a; ¯ a) 0:3 0:2 0:5 0.2 0.3 0.5
(¯ a;a) 0:3 0:4 0:3 0.4 0.3 0.3
(a; ¯ a) 0:4 0:4 0:2 ⇒ 0.4 0.4 0.2
(a;a) 0:3 0:6 0:1 0.6 0.3 0.1
LR 1.0 0.5 1.6 0.5 1.0 1.6
The likelihood ratio (LR in the table) is not monotone in the original numbers
1;2;3, but we have a permutation k(1);k(2);k(3) so that LR is monotone. It is
easy for the reader to check that (¯ a;a) FOS-dominates both (a; ¯ a) and 1
2((¯ a; ¯ a)+
(a;a)) (in terms of k(1);:::;k(N)), and hence, only the ﬁnal outcome matters in
the optimal contract.
3 Extension
In this section, we extend the basic model to a T-period setup and show that a
similar result as in Theorem 1 are obtained. As in Section 2, we let at ∈{¯ a;a}=A
and xt ∈ {x1;:::;xN} = X denote the agent’s actions and outcomes in each period
t = 1;··· ;T, respectively. We also let at = (a1;:::;at) and xt = (x1;:::;xt). The
16distribution of each outcome xt is dependent on the whole past history of actions




xt = xi | at]
; i = 1;··· ;N:
Throughout this section, we assume the monotone likelihood ratio property
(MLRP) for the ﬁnal period outcome:
pT
1(¯ a;:::; ¯ a; ¯ a)
pT
1(¯ a;:::; ¯ a;a)
< ··· <
pT
N(¯ a;:::; ¯ a; ¯ a)
pT
N(¯ a;:::; ¯ a;a)
:
This is just for a simpliﬁcation as in Subsection 2.2. If the model does not satisfy
MLRP, we can rearrange the order of outcomes so that the sufﬁcient condition for
the simple contracts as given below is written in a consistent way (see Subsec-
tion 2.3). It should be noted that MLRP is imposed only on the distributions by
(¯ a;:::; ¯ a; ¯ a) and (¯ a;:::; ¯ a;a).
WealsoassumethattheagentdecideshisentireactionproﬁleaT =(a1;··· ;aT)
at the beginning of period 1 and that he never changes this proﬁle after observing
the outcomes in each period.14 We split the agent’s action space AT = A×···×A









; k = 0;:::;T:
That is, Ak is the set of the action proﬁle aT in which there are k weak efforts
a (and hence, T −k strong efforts ¯ a).15 For instance, if T = 3, then we have
A0 = {(¯ a; ¯ a; ¯ a)}, A1 = {(¯ a; ¯ a;a);(¯ a;a; ¯ a);(a; ¯ a; ¯ a)}, etc.
Let V(a;w) denote the agent’s gross expected payoff from payment schedule
w when he takes action proﬁle a. Then, the agent’s net expected payoff is written
14In the basic model presented in Section 2, it is assumed that the agent makes his second-
period action a2 after observing the ﬁrst-period outcome x1; therefore, the action proﬁle consists
of N +1 components (a1;a2
1;:::;a2
N), where a2
i denotes the second-period action when the ﬁrst-
period outcome is xi. For the T-period model in this section, we may also consider the possibility
that the agent’s actions depend on past outcomes (the action proﬁle in such a model consists of
(NT −1)=(N−1) components), but such a consideration does not change the result in Theorem 2.
See the Appendix for more on this point.
15It is obvious that (A0;:::;AT) satisﬁes Ak∩Al = / 0 for any k;l (k̸=l), and
∪
kAk =A. Hence,
(A0;··· ;AT) is a partition of A.
17as
V(a;w)−C·m(a);
where C is the cost of a strong effort ¯ a (as in Section 2) and m(a) is the number
of strong efforts in action proﬁle a. Then, the incentive compatibility constraint in
the T-period model is simpliﬁed as follows: for k = 1;:::;T,
V(¯ a;:::; ¯ a;w)−C·k ≥V(a′;w); for all a′ ∈ Ak: (ICk)
Now, we have an extension of Assumption 1.















i (¯ a;:::; ¯ a;a) (6)
holds for all j = 1;:::;N.
The following is an important example of Assumption 2.
Example 3 (Human capital investment). Suppose that the distributions of out-
comes in each period are dependent not on the detail of past actions, but on the
number of strong efforts that the agent has taken to date. To be speciﬁc, we let
qi(k) denote the probability distribution when the agent has undertaken k strong
efforts, and provide pt
i(·) as
pt
i(a1;:::;at) = qi(#{t ≤t | at = ¯ a}):
Such distributions depict the agent’s human capital investment or the learning-by-
doing effect of the agent’s effort.
In this example, the requirement of Assumption 2 is the following: For all










18holds for all j = 1;:::;N. This condition seems rather artiﬁcial, but it includes










This inequality states that the marginal “beneﬁt” in the probability distribution of
one additional effort is decreasing in k. It is easy to show that (7) is a special case
of condition (ii).16
Theorem 2. Suppose that pT
i (·) satisﬁes Assumption 2. Then, payments in the
optimal long-term contract are dependent only on the ﬁnal outcome xT.
Remark. Assumption 2 is imposed only on the distribution of outcomes in the
ﬁnal period (t = T), and how the efforts of the agent affect the outcomes in other
periods (t = 1;:::;T −1) is irrelevant to the result of Theorem 2. We should
discuss the reason brieﬂy.
As long as the principal wants to make the agent work hard in the ﬁnal period
(t = T), the optimal wage should depend (at least) on the ﬁnal outcome, xT. If the
economic environment satisﬁes Assumption 2, then the agent works hard in other
periods (t = 1;:::;T −1) under the wage scheme that gives enough incentives to
workhardintheﬁnalperiod. Aslongastheprincipalﬁndsitoptimaltoimplement
high efforts (as usually assumed in studies on moral hazard, including the present
16Kwon (2006) investigated a similar model with binary outcomes (N = 2) and showed that
the optimal long-term contract is dependent only on the ﬁnal outcome under the assumption of
“nonincreasing marginal returns.” Although nonincreasing marginal returns is an easy assumption
to interpret economically, it is a rather strong assumption if T is a substantially large number, as it
requires that the inequality (7) be satisﬁed for all possible numbers of high efforts, k=1;:::;T −1.
On the other hand, consider the following distributions when T = 3 and N = 2:
q1(0) = 0:9; q1(1) = 0:8; q1(2) = 0:2; q1(3) = 0:1;
(q1(·) represents the probability of “failure” when N = 2). This is not “nonincreasing returns,” but
it satisﬁes our FOSD condition. Our result suggests that what is central to the incentives in simple
contracts is the FOSD relationship, and nonincreasing marginal returns is just one example of the
condition. In addition, note that the two conditions coincide if (and only if) T = 2.
19one), otherdistributionsareirrelevantintheprincipal’scostminimizationproblem
and only the ﬁnal distribution is central to the contract in which only the ﬁnal
outcome matters.
We should also discuss that Assumption 2 is close to a “necessary” condition
in the following informal manner. Suppose that k = 1 and only a′ =(a; ¯ a;:::; ¯ a) ∈
A1 violates (6). If the contract gives enough incentive to work hard in the ﬁnal
period (and the IC in the ﬁnal period is binding), the agent ﬁnds it optimal to work
hard in periodst =2;:::;T, but may not in the ﬁrst period.17 If the utility function
oftheagentissuchthattheincentivetoworkhardintheﬁrstperiodisnotprovided
by the simple contract, the principal needs to rewrite the contract. However, the
precise form of the optimal contract is complicated in dynamic models, so we
cannot argue whether or not only the ﬁnal outcome matters in the optimal contract
in the way using the FOSD condition as shown in the present paper.
Sketch of the proof. As in the proof of Theorem 1, we can show that the optimal
long-term contract is independent of outcome history xT−1 up to the period T −1,
if all incentive constraints are not binding with the exception of
V(¯ a;:::; ¯ a; ¯ a;w)−C ≥V(¯ a;:::; ¯ a;a;w) (8)
In the following, we show that the derived contract, which is dependent only on
the ﬁnal outcome xT, satisﬁes all incentive compatibility constraints.
As the derived contract w∗ satisﬁes (8) with equality, we have
C =V(¯ a;:::; ¯ a; ¯ a;w∗)−V(¯ a;:::; ¯ a;a;w∗): (9)
For each k = 1;:::;T, substituting (9) into (ICk) yields:
k·V(¯ a;:::; ¯ a;a;w∗) ≥ (k−1)·V(¯ a;:::; ¯ a; ¯ a;w∗)+V(a′;w∗):
Condition (6) ensures that this inequality holds.
17FOSD between random variables X andY is a sufﬁcient condition for that E[u(X)] ≥ E[u(Y)]
holds for an exogenously given increasing function u(·), but not a necessary one (Shaked and
Shanthikumar (2007)).
204 Concluding Remarks
This paper explores the role of history dependence in a dynamic moral hazard
model. It is shown that, under certain conditions on the probability distributions
of outcomes, the optimal long-term contract is such that the payment schedules
are not contingent upon the realization of past outcomes. This ﬁnding contrasts
strikingly with the results in repeated moral hazard models, where the optimal
long-term contracts are generally dependent on the complete history of past out-
comes.
An important point of the results is the relationship between statistical infor-
mativeness of the signals (outcomes) and its effects on incentive problems in the
optimal contracts. In the light of statistical inference of agent’s past efforts, the
history of all outcomes must be valuable to the principal (i.e., informative), be-
cause the distributions of outcomes are assumed to be independent over time in
the present analysis (Apart from the information provided by x2 about a1, x1 pro-
vides a statistically independent information about a1). The principal, however,
sometimes ﬁnds it optimal to ignore such x1 in the present paper. We believe the
result that the principal ﬁnds it optimal to “ignore” informative signals is found in
other (non-trivial) contract theory models, but we leave this for future research.
This paper demonstrated a particular class of dynamic moral hazard models in
which the optimal contract is written in a simple manner. This extra conclusion
brings some new insights to the incentive provision in moral hazard problems,
but does not extend to general models on which we pose no conditions on the
information structure. Perhaps more important question is to explore the general
structure of dynamic incentives in which efforts have persistent effects over time.
The general theoretical examination of these problems remains to be done.
21Appendix
In this Appendix, we provide some mathematical arguments for footnote 14 in
Section 3.
Suppose that the agent is to undertake actions dependent on past outcomes.
We think of such an agent’s strategy as a sequence of “behavior strategy”; for
example,
a = (a1;a2(x1);a3(x1;x2);:::;aT(x1;:::;xT−1));
where each at :{1;:::;N}t−1 →A is a mapping from the history of past outcomes
(up to period t −1) to the action in period t.
The problem in footnote 14 is whether the agent improves his payoff by se-
lecting such a history-dependent strategy a (rather than a history-independent
strategy a = (a1;a2;:::;aT)).
Theorem 3. If the contract is simple, then the agent cannot improve his payoff by
selecting a history-dependent strategy a.

































(x1;:::;xT−1) | at(x1;:::;xt−1) = at for t = 1;:::;T
}
;
that is, I(a;a) is the set of historical outcomes with the positive probability that
action proﬁle a is played under strategy a.
Because every history (x1;:::;xT−1) generates exactly one action proﬁle, a












 = 1 for any a:
As the expected value of random variables does not exceed the maximum of the
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